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The Molten Salt Fast Reactor (MSFR) with its liquid circulating fuel and its fast neutron spectrum calls for
a new safety approach including technological neutral methodologies and analysis tools adapted to early
design phases. In the frame of the Horizon2020 program SAMOFAR (Safety Assessment of the Molten Salt
Fast Reactor) a safety approach suitable for Molten Salt Reactors is being developed and applied to the
MSFR. After a description of the MSFR reference design, this paper focuses on the identification of the
Postulated Initiating Events (PIEs), which is a core part of the global assessment methodology. To fulfil
this task, the Functional Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FFMEA) and the Master Logic Diagram (MLD)
are selected and employed separately in order to be as exhaustive as possible in the identification of the
initiating events of the system. Finally, an extract of the list of PIEs, selected as the most representative
events resulting from the implementation of both methods, is presented to illustrate the methodology
and some of the outcomes of the methods are compared in order to highlight symbioses and differences
between the MLD and the FFMEA.
© 2019 Korean Nuclear Society, Published by Elsevier Korea LLC. This is an open access article under the
CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
The Generation IV International Forum (GIF) has established a
set of goals as research directions for future nuclear systems, which
are sustainability, safety and reliability, economic competitiveness,
proliferation resistance and physical protection [1]. These goals
provided the basis for selecting six nuclear energy systems for
further development. Among them, the Molten Salt Fast Reactor
(MSFR) was retained in 2008 for its promising design and safety
characteristics [2] and is currently studied in the frame of the Ho-
rizon2020 program SAMOFAR (Safety Assessment of the Molten
Salt Fast Reactor). The objective of SAMOFAR is to prove the inno-
vative safety concepts of the MSFR by advanced experimental and
numerical techniques and to deliver a breakthrough in nuclearrdin), anna.uggenti@polito.it
Beils), andrea.carpignano@
Dulla), merle@lpsc.in2p3.fr
uer), laureau@lpsc.in2p3.fr
by Elsevier Korea LLC. This is an
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y, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.nesafety. Improved safety being recognized as a priority in the
development and operation of nuclear systems, the development of
a safety approach suitable for the MSFR and its application to the
reactor is one of the main tasks of the SAMOFAR project. Indeed,
because of its unique characteristics (e.g. the liquid circulating fuel
playing also the role of coolant), the MSFR calls for a new safety
approach based on technological neutral methodologies and
relying on the fundamental safety principles [3]. In addition, the
analysis tools selected have to be adapted to the MSFR early design
phases. Moreover, the safety assessment should be performed in
parallel to the design studies allowing to influence the direction of
the concept and the design development since its earliest stages by
giving useful feedbacks and guidance to the designer in order to
achieve a safety that is “built in” rather than “added on” [4]. To fulfil
these objectives, an integral safety assessment methodology for
MSFRs has been proposed in the frame of the SAMOFAR project [5]
and is based on the GIF Integrated Safety Assessment Methodology
(ISAM) [6] and themethodology developed in the framework of the
SARGENIV [7]. These methodologies are selected as conceptual
methodologies by the partners of the SAMOFAR project and suc-
cessively adapted to the peculiar case of the MSFR through theopen access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
tification of the postulated initiating events of the Molten Salt Fast
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point of strength of ISAM is the direct link with the different levels
of Defence-in-Depth (DiD): these levels, as well as the entire
methodology, depends on the definition of the severe accident, risk
metrics and physical barriers that represent still an argument of
discussion for the MSFR. Therefore, the direct implementation of
some of the tools of the ISAM to theMSFR resulted in being difficult,
given the preliminary stage of the safety analysis and design of this
concept. To overcome these difficulties, it has been chosen to rather
use the ISAM as a guideline to formalize the objectives to be ach-
ieved. The first step of the ISAM, the Qualitative Safety Features
Review (QSR), has been partly applied to the MSFR [8] and has
pointed out the risk of fuel leak as a potential weak point of the
design. This analysis has led to an evolution of the MSFR fuel circuit
design in order to better cope with the risk of leak [9]. In a second
step, the identification of the MSFR hazards has been undertaken.
In this phase of risk assessment, it has been chosen to perform the
identification of the hazards without defining the DiD levels con-
cerned, whereas in a later stage, the completion with the DiD level
identification could be of help to ensure that the safety architecture
is well balanced, consistently with the Objective Provision Tree
analytical tool reckoned in the ISAM.
This paper focuses on the identification of the potential hazards
likely to challenge the MSFR safety and the elaboration of a list
Postulated Initiating Events (PIEs), which is a core part of the global
assessment methodology. To fulfil this task, the Functional Failure
Mode and Effect Analysis (FFMEA) [10], which is suggested as
complementary tool to fulfil this objective in the ISAM presenta-
tion, see Ref. [6], and the Master Logic Diagram (MLD) [11], which is
a top-down method with a tree structure (mentioned for initiating
events identification in one of the presented option in the guidance
document for the application of the ISAM, see Ref. [12]), are
selected and employed separately in order to be as exhaustive as
possible in the identification of initiating events. Moreover, the
members of the team performing the analysis have expertise in the
implementation of these tools. Then, the PIEs are selected as the
most representative events resulting from the implementation of
bothmethods. The final list of PIEs will be amajor input for the later
steps of the global safety assessment methodology as the Deter-
ministic Safety Analysis or the Probabilistic Safety Analysis. One
main objective of the safety assessment methodology is to give
feedbacks on the design, and the methods proposed in this paper
also participate to this purpose by highlighting some open options
in the design and giving some indications on their potential impact
from the safety point of view.
In section 2 the MSFR reference design used for the SAMOFAR
project is presented, defining the studied system and its peculiar-
ities; moreover some open points of the design are highlighted and
the need for using technological neutral methodologies such as the
ISAM is clarified. Afterwards, in section 3 the methodology chosen
to compile the PIEs list of the MSFR is introduced, including the
description of the FFMEA and MLD tools and the method of PIEs
selection. Section 4 presents a preliminary list of the identified PIEsTable 1
Characteristics of the MSFR fuel circuit.
Mean fuel salt temperature in fuel circuit (C)
Fuel salt temperature rise in the core (C)
Total fuel salt volume (m3)
Total fuel salt cycle in the fuel circuit (s)
Fuel salt dilation coefficient (g.cm3.K1)
Total feedback coefficient (pcm.K1)
Hyperboloid core dimensions (m)
Fuel salt density (g.cm3)
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highlight symbioses and differences between the MLD and the
FFMEA.
2. Description of the MSFR system
2.1. General description
Themain characteristic of theMSFR is to use a fuel in the form of
a molten salt. This fuel salt circulates in the fuel circuit where it is
cooled down and plays therefore the role of coolant as well. The
reference reactor, as defined at the beginning of the SAMOFAR
project, is a 3 GW thermal power reactor with a thermodynamic
efficiency of about 45%, a fast neutron spectrum and a breeding
ratio of 1.1 [13]. The MSFR includes three main closed circuits for
heat extraction from the fuel during power operation (the fuel
circuit, the intermediate circuit and the power conversion circuit)
and an open circuit acting as heat sink.
The selected fuel salt is a molten binary fluoride salt with
77.5 mol% of lithium fluoride, the remaining 22.5 mol% being a mix
of heavy nuclei fluorides including the fissile and the fertile matter
[13]. The fluids of the intermediate and conversion circuits have not
been selected yet and constitute one of the open points of the
system, however several options are proposed and will be studied
in the frame of the SAMOFAR project. Other design open points will
be described in paragraph 2.3.
2.2. Fuel circuit description
The fuel circuit is defined as the circuit containing the fuel salt
during power operation and includes the core cavity and the
cooling sectors allowing the heat extraction. Its specificities are
summarized in Table 1.
The core shape is a hyperboloid resulting from previous opti-
mization studies to improve the fuel flow in the core and limit the
recirculation zones [14]. In addition, an integrated geometry of the
fuel circuit (Fig. 1) was proposed in the frame of the SAMOFAR
project in order to prevent the risk of fuel leakages highlighted by
preliminary safety studies [15]. This solution foresees a vessel (Fig.1
Top right) used as container for the fuel salt, vessel in which the 16
cooling sectors are disposed circumferentially (Fig. 1 Bottom right).
Each sector (Fig. 1 Bottom left) comprises a heat exchanger, a cir-
culation pump, a gas processing system, and a fertile blanket tank.
A neutron shielding in B4C is positioned between the blanket and
the heat exchangers to protect the heat exchangers from the
neutron flux and to increase the breeding ratio. In addition, thick
reflectors made of nickel-based alloys are located at the bottom and
the top of the vessel to protect the structures located outside the
core [9,16].
The fuel circulation drifts the delayed neutron precursors in low
importance areas, reducing the effective fraction of delayed neu-
trons and contributing to the reactor fast behaviour. The reactivity
being mainly controlled by the neutronic feedback reactions (e.g.725
100
18 (half in the core and half in the cooling sectors)
3.9
8.82.104
8
Radius: 1.06 to 1.41
Height: 1.6 to 2.26
4.1
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Fig. 1. Schematic representation of a cooling sector (bottom left), of the cooling sector
arrangement in the core vessel (bottom right), of the storage tank arrangement around
the core vessel (top left), and of the reactor vessel (top right).
D. Gerardin et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Technology xxx (xxxx) xxx 3no control rods are foreseen in the core), the fast response is not
problematic for the reactor operation. The reactor feedback co-
efficients (density effect and Doppler Effect) are all negative, acting
rapidly since the heat is produced directly in the coolant. The
density effect comes from the fuel dilation that is possible thanks to
an expansion vessel, which is a tank located at the top of the fuel
circuit. Therefore, the core presents a very intrinsically stable
behaviour to reactivity insertions [17].2.3. Systems in interaction with the fuel circuit and open points on
the design
Several sub-systems are connected to the fuel circuit, in
particular, the fertile blanket and its cooling circuit, the fuel circuit
walls cooling, the intermediate circuit, the Emergency Draining
System (EDS), the fuel storage tanks, the gas bubbling system and
the sampling for fuel processing. The objective of this section is to
highlight their interactions and the possible impact on the subse-
quent safety analyses. In addition, special attention is paid on the
design open points and on the possible improvements that were
identified thanks to the safety analysis.
Firstly, the fertile blanket allows the breeding ratio of the reactor
to increase and participates to the radial neutron shielding. The
system comprises a blanket tank filled with fertile salt at liquid
state, which is an integral part of the sector and is located in the
circumference of the core. The fertile salt is heated up by the
neutrons coming from the core losing their energy by scattering or
being trapped (mainly by thorium) and by the fission of U233 which
is produced by capture on the thorium; therefore it needs to be
cooled down. Several design options are foreseen for the fertile salt
cooling: an internal cooling option where the intermediate salt
directly cools down the blanket tank or an external cooling option,
in which the blanket tank is connected to a fertile circuit with a
pump and a heat exchanger where the fertile salt is cooled down by
the intermediate salt.
Then, the fuel circuit is connected to the intermediate circuit
through the heat exchangers, which are designed to ensure the
leak-tightness of the zones where the intermediate fluid circulates.
Furthermore, the pressure of the intermediate circuit is higher than
the one of the fuel circuit in order to prevent fuel leakage in case of
a heat exchanger leak. The study of the intermediate circuit is to be
led, keeping in mind that the reactor is mainly driven by heat
extraction (e.g. there are no control rods in the core) [17]. Four
intermediate circuits are considered, each of them feeding four
cooling sectors in order to ensure the core cooling even if one cir-
cuit fails. The intermediate salt is also used to cool down the fertilePlease cite this article as: D. Gerardin et al., A methodology for the iden
Reactor, Nuclear Engineering and Technology, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neblanket and the core walls in order to prevent their thermal
degradation due to possible hot spots. However it should be
determined whether this function is achieved by a unique inter-
mediate circuit or if a dedicated cooling circuit has to be used for
the walls and the fertile blanket. The application of the proposed
safety analysis method and the reflection on the confinement
barrier definition also highlighted the need to provide sufficient
valves to isolate systems in case of malfunction or leakage.
In case of incident/accident during power production, the fuel
can be drained gravitationally toward an emergency draining tank
designed to passively remove the residual heat over a long period of
time [9]. The residual heat associated to the fuel salt represents
around 3.8% of the nominal power at the moment t ¼ 0s where
reactor shuts down; thus this value corresponds to themaximum of
the residual power of the salt in time [8]. The fuel circuit is con-
nected to this Emergency Draining System (EDS) through active
and passive gates or plugs located in the bottom reflector (Fig. 1.Top
left). A gas connection between the fuel circuit and the EDS allows a
fast draining (around 100S). In addition to the emergency draining,
a routine draining system, triggered only by active means, is used to
transfer the fuel to storage areas for maintenance operations. The
siphons for routine core draining and filling are placed on the sides
of the core vessel. The calculations to design of the EDS are on-
going; it constitutes one of the tasks of the SAMOFAR project.
An in-core gas bubbling system is used to clean the salt from
gaseous fission products and metallic particles. The gas is injected
at the bottom of the core and recovered at the top to be cleaned up
from a part of the fission products in the gas processing unit (Fig. 1.
Bottom left) before being re-injected in the core. The gas processing
unit requires a dedicated cooling system as the residual heat, at
reactor shutdown, in this location represents around 1.4% of the
nominal power [8]. The specific components of the bubbling sys-
tem constitute one of the open points of the design to be defined.
Finally, the fuel processing is done/performed through online
fuel punctures and the loading is done by fluid transfer during
reactor operation. Thus, fuel salt and fertile salt samplings are
regularly performed to control and adjust their chemical compo-
sition and inventory. The frequent adjustment of the fuel compo-
sition allows low reactivity reserves in core. Nevertheless, it
involves a risk of reactivity insertion due to incorrect fuel compo-
sition at loading and of leak during the transfer to the processing
unit. However, since the amount of daily-injected fuel is quite small
(10e40 L per day), the associated consequences are limited. In the
reference design of SAMOFAR, the salt puncture is done at the top of
the core, through a lid over the fuel circuit expansion vessel; the
safety analysis helped identifying this lid as a potential weak point
and other options are currently under study.
A more complete description of the fuel circuit and the systems
connected to the fuel circuit is in SAMOFAR deliverable 1.1 [16].
The peculiarities of the MSFR, summarized in this paragraph,
and the preliminary stage of its design call for use of technological
neutral methodologies such as the ISAM in support of the safety
assessment, as reckoned by the GIF. Such methodologies should
help, as they are being deployed, to catch and address the speci-
ficities of the MSFR concept. Indeed, current nuclear safety re-
quirements and methodologies applicable to solid-fuel reactor
concepts, in particular LWRs technology, may not be fully relevant
in the MSFR context: for example, some LWR risk metrics (such as
the Core Damage Frequencye CDF) are not significant for theMSFR.
Additionally, the severe accident, traditionally coincident with the
core melting, needs an updated and more general definition.
Moreover, the physical barriers for the containment of radionu-
clides suited to the MSFRs needs, due to the liquid and circulating
nature of the fuel, necessitate to be defined [18]. These examples
clarify the need of a technologically neutral methodology,tification of the postulated initiating events of the Molten Salt Fast
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comes to MSFR development. Of course, such methodology should
always represent a practical declination of the IAEA Fundamental
Safety Principles [3].
3. Description of the methodology
In order to be as exhaustive as possible, it is proposed for the
MSFR to use two different approaches for identifying potential
accident initiating events (IEs). In addition, the design of the MSFR
being still in development and the operating procedures (start-up,
shutdown and maintenance) under definition [19], the safety
approach has to include appropriate methods, usable despite the
lack of knowledge on components, systems or procedures. For this
purpose, the Master Logic Diagram (top down approach) and the
FFMEA (functional bottom up approach) have been selected. Both
methods and their applications to the MSFR are described in the
following paragraphs. These methods aim at being coherent with
the ISAM. The MLD contributes to the preparation of the Objective
Provision Tree (OPT), one of the tools proposed in the ISAM, whose
objective is to help identifying all provisions needed to sketch the
design safety architecture in order to guarantee the safety func-
tions. In that respect, the MLD contribution is to provide a sys-
tematic identification of hazards that could affect the plant,
through a top down approach with an event tree structure. The
FFMEA aims at systematically investigating the hazards that could
affect the MSFR functionality and allows also to recognize critical
components, lack of information and/or criticalities of the design
and necessity of supplementary provisions. In this optics, the out-
puts of the FFMEA can give insights to other ISAM tools, such as the
OPT and the PIRT, the Phenomena and Identification Ranking Table,
whose objective is to identify plausible phenomena significantly
contributing to risk. Due to the very preliminary stage of MSFR
design, the identification of the hazardous events is not arranged
according to the DiD levels, which could be done in a later stage
together with identification of the associated layers of provisions,
as reckoned for a full deployment of the OPT tool.
The work has been performed by a team composed by design
expert, safety experts and industrial experts, several of them having
previous experiences in the use of FFMEA andMLD tools. Moreover,
experts’ judgement and experience feedback, e.g. from the ORNL
MSRE [20], have been taken into account for the sake of exhaus-
tiveness. The IEs identified here correspond to internal events thatTable 2
Extract from the FFMEA MSFR table.
Process function PBS elements Op. Md. Failure mode Cau
P1 To generate electricity
P1.1 To generate heat by
realizing fissions in core
cavity
P1.1.1 To provide fuel salt
inventory in the core cavity
P1.1.1.1 To keep and preserve
the integrity and leak-
tightness of the core cavity
Core vessel NOp-P Loss of containment
leak-tightness
Leak
in th
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conditions of the fuel circuit. Then, from the complete list of IEs, a
set of postulated initiating events (PIEs) is selected as the most
representative in terms of challenging conditions for the safety of
the plant. In such a way, it is possible to focus safety studies on the
most relevant initiating events. In paragraph 3.3, the process of PIEs
selection is described, as it was applied to the FFMEA and to the
MLD.
3.1. Functional Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
The Functional Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FFMEA) is a
suitable qualitative methodology to define possible incident and
accident initiators when a sufficient design detail is not available to
allow more specific evaluations at component level, by investi-
gating systematically components failures that could affect system
functionality [21]. The main functions of the plant (process func-
tions, safety functions, investment protection functions, etc.) are
defined at first through the Functional Breakdown Structure (FBS)
and specified in sub-functions. Moreover, the available design in-
formation and design intents (defined in the FBS) are collected and
all the systems and components of the plant are listed in order to
define the Plant Breakdown Structure (PBS). Then, each main
function can be correlated to one or more than one of the com-
ponents. Subsequently, the FFMEA table is compiled, postulating
the loss of the functions rather than the specific failures of systems
and components: in this way, it is possible to overcome the lack of
information of systems design. Nonetheless, reference to systems/
components is always highlighted, as much as possible, in order to
investigate causes and safety consequences. Furthermore, possible
improvements, prevention and mitigation actions are recom-
mended. The objective of the FFMEA is to provide a complete list of
potential initiating events (IEs) and give suggestions in order to
improve the overall safety of the system/reactor [10].
The FFMEA allows performing MSFR safety assessment,
notwithstanding its very preliminary state of design, in order to
identify functional deviations able to compromise system safety, to
list Postulated Initiating Events (PIEs) and to recognize critical
components, lack of information and/or criticalities of the design
and necessity of supplementary safety provisions.
Table 2 shows an extract of the FFMEA table compiled for the
process functions of the MSFR in normal operation conditions
during power production. The analysis focuses on the fuel circuitse Consequences PIE
/Rupture
e core vessel
The fuel flows outside the core
cavity;
The amount of fissile matter in
the core decreases leading to
the shutdown of the chain
reaction;
The fuel is collected in the
collector where it is subcritical;
The fuel is drained in the EDS
where it is in a subcritical
configuration and is cooled
down in order to remove
residual heat;
Etc.
Loss Of Liquid Fuel in the
bottom part of the core cavity:
Breach in the lower reflector
tification of the postulated initiating events of the Molten Salt Fast
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the intermediate circuit, the wall cooling system, the gas bubbling
system and the sampling system. A first application of the FFMEA to
the MSFR is available on [22] with more details on each step of the
methodology.
3.2. Master Logic Diagram
The Master Logic Diagram (MLD) is a qualitative risk analysis
method whose purpose is to identify the hazards and possible
initiating events of a system, through a deductive and structured
approach. This “top-down” approach is particularly well suited for
projects in early design phases as the analysis is based on physical
phenomena and general considerations rather than specific com-
ponents of the design. It also proves to be helpful to highlight the
correlations between different functions/phenomena and can
therefore be an asset in the study of complex systems such as nu-
clear power plants. It has been widely used in nuclear industry as
well as in other engineering fields such as chemical plants and
processes [11].
The main steps of the method can be summarized as follow:
- Identification of the top event, which is the undesired situation
to be prevented.
- Decomposition of the top-event into detailed sub-events, each
sub-event being a possible cause of the considered top-event.
The development continues until a sufficient level of details is
reached and events directly challenging the safety functions are
identified. In this step, the consideration of all physically
possible phenomena is crucial for the completeness of the
approach.
- Identification of the initiating events as the basic events that
cannot be further divided into sub-events.
The diagram is usually presented in the form of a qualitative
fault tree based on Boolean logic beginning with the top event and
where the lower levels of the tree show the elementary failures.
The MLD method has been applied to the MSFR for the normal
operation state of power production, similarly to the FFMEAFig. 2. Extract of th
Please cite this article as: D. Gerardin et al., A methodology for the iden
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confinement barrier. Therefore, the fuel circuit degradation or fuel
circuit failure is selected as top event in the current study. An
extract of the compiled tree, produced with the Arbre-Analyste
software [23], is presented in Fig. 2 where the top event is
decomposed according to the phenomena involved (thermal,
chemical, mechanical, etc.).
3.3. Identification and discussion of the PIEs
In order to identify the PIEs, all the elementary IEs are listed in a
unique document and are grouped into families, depending on
their potential effects on the reactor.
The grouping of IEs in a family is usually done according to
criteria of similarity of the consequences associated to the single IE
and of plant response.
The common practice is then to define incident and accident
categories with associated occurrence frequency ranges. For a given
family, PIE are then identified as envelope cases in a given category
(i.e., in a given occurrence frequency range). Therefore, not only the
low probability cases with potentially severe consequences should
be identified, but also the “not so low probability events” for which
criteria will be more stringent. The evaluation of the expected
frequency for each PIE should be performed preliminary in a first
time given the premature state of the current design (at least dis-
tinguishing frequent events, rare events, and very rare events),
based on engineering judgement. Low probability events may also
be postulated, based on the defence-in-depth principle.
For the objective of this analysis, only the most severe events of
a family in terms of consequences are selected as PIEs [10], with no
consideration for their occurrence frequency in a first time, which
should be done in a later stage (at least with occurrence frequency
ranges or expected orders of magnitude). At this stage, it is not
always obvious to identify the most severe events: therefore, it has
sometimes been chosen to maintain a significant number of IEs as
PIEs, which could be optimized in a later stage. As final result of the
work, each identified PIE has to be discussed outlining the possible
accidental sequences and deterministic analyses shall be per-
formed to verify the plant capacity to mitigate the consequences, toe MSFR MLD.
tification of the postulated initiating events of the Molten Salt Fast
t.2019.01.009
D. Gerardin et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Technology xxx (xxxx) xxx6check the compliance with safety limits and to drive the choices for
the selection of the reference design [24]. It is besides reminded
that the DiD principle is the fundamental principle to use for the
safety analysis. In that respect, it is also underlined that some PIEs
have been selected independently of their likelihood at this stage,
with the goal to drive the analysis towards the consideration of all
phenomena of potential interest (for example: fuel salt freezing
scenario, postulated prompt critical power excursion with induced
shockwave…): some of themmay be later found not to be possible
in the future MSFR studies and thus withdrawn from the PIEs list.
If events are estimated not to lead to any safety relevant
disturbance, they can be classified as not relevant from the safety
point of view (N/S). These events will not be analysed from the
safety issue, nevertheless they can be important in the future when
Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Inspectability (RAMI)
analysis will be performed [10].
This methodology should be iteratively applied, following the
design development; similarly, the list of the PIEs evolves with the
detail of the design and the investigation of the physical phe-
nomena governing the behaviour of the system, through deter-
ministic analyses. Therefore, this methodology aims at influencing
the direction of the concept and design development from its
earliest stages.
4. Results
4.1. PIEs list
As stated/explained above, PIEs are generally determined by
looking at the set of elementary failures that compromise process
functions and induce consequences of safety concern, grouping
events that induce similar consequences in the plant into familiesTable 3
Extract of assumed representative events from the list of Postulated Initiating Events ob
F1: Bulk precipitation of fissile matter (e.g because of an inlet of water)
F1: Accidental insertion of fuel
F1: Important deformation of the fuel circuit possibly leading to an increased core volu
collapse)
F1: Fertile blanket loading with fuel salt
F1 & F2: Fuel salt freezing scenario
F1 & F6: Rupture/obstruction of reactivity bubble injector
F2: Blockage of all sectors of fuel salt circuit
F2: Complete rupture or blockage of all the fuel circuit pumps
F3: Overworking of all the fuel circuit pumps
F3: conversion circuit pumps overworking
F3: Over-working of the pumps of the intermediate circuit
F4: Obstruction/blockage of the intermediate circuit
F4: complete loss of intermediate salt
F4: Rupture/blockage of all intermediate circuit pumps
F5: Breach in the core vessel
F5: Breach in the lower reflector (with rupture of the structure cooling system)
F5: Breach in the upper reflector with rupture of the structure cooling system and/or
F5: Breach of a heat exchanger plate/channel
F5: Rupture of blanket tank wall between fuel and fertile salt with rupture of the fuel
F5: Rupture of a pipe of the reactivity control system
F5& F11: Rupture of the connection between the free surface of the fuel storage tank an
valve
F6: Rupture of horizontal bubble injector for salt cleaning
F6: Rupture of the gas separation chamber
F6: Undetected deviation of the chemical composition
F6: Rupture of the gas processing unit (with possible leak of processing fluid)
F6: Chemical reaction between different fluids (e.g. hot part of intermediate circuit an
F6 & F11: Inlet of water
F7: Detachment of the wall thermal protection
F9: Complete rupture of the pressurised sampling device
F10: Prompt critical power excursion with induced shockwave
F11: Obstruction of all free levels (including the vertical inlet pipe from the core to th
F12: Ejection of a conversion system component
F13: Total loss of electric power
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of the group of events. The families of events identified for the
MSFR are:
 F1: Reactivity insertion
 F2: Loss of fuel flow
 F3: Increase of heat extraction/over-cooling
 F4: Decrease of heat extraction
 F5: Loss of fuel circuit tightness
 F6: Loss of fuel composition/chemistry control
 F7: Fuel circuit structures over-heating
 F8: Loss of cooling of other systems containing radioactive
materials
 F9: Loss of containment of radioactive materials in other
systems
 F10: Mechanical degradation of the fuel circuit
 F11: Loss of pressure control in fuel circuit
 F12: Conversion circuit leak
 F13: Loss of electric power supply
Since the conceptual phase of the design and the iterative nature
of the methodology, this list will be updated following the evolu-
tion of the available information (in terms of design detail, reactor
transients, experimental analyses, etc). The most severe Initiating
Events of each family is selected as Postulated Initiating event.
Table 3 presents an extract from the PIEs list obtained by the FFMEA
and the MLD, with a selection of PIEs assumed to be representative
accident initiators. These representative accident initiators
are assumed to envelope all the IEs in terms of radiological
consequences.
As an illustrationof theplant behaviour in someevents, the caseof
loss of liquid fuelflow family ispreliminarydescribedhereafter. In thetained by the FFMEA and the MLD.
me (e.g. the welded joints taking the recirculation sectors in the correct position
with damages to the expansion vessel system
circuit walls cooling circuit
d the free surface of the core for the gas in the part between the core cavity and the
d water)
e expansion vessel)
tification of the postulated initiating events of the Molten Salt Fast
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loss of flow is assumed to be relatively fast as the components
improving the inertia (e.g., pump flywheels) are unavailable. More-
over, in case of pump rupture, broken parts of the pump could enter
the fuel flow. In the event “blockage of all sectors of fuel salt circuit”,
the rapidity of the loss of flow depends on the nature of the blockage
which can be caused by the presence of external elements in the fuel
circuit, the presence of broken components of the fuel circuit, the
precipitation or the solidification of the fuel in the heat exchanger. In
the events “complete rupture or blockage of all the fuel circuit
pumps” and “blockage of all sectors of fuel salt circuit”, the complete
loss of fuelflowcauses the increase of the temperature in the core and
thus the shutdown of the chain reaction because of the negative
feedback. After the shutdown of the chain reaction, the temperature
of the fuel in the core and in the part of the fuel circuit that are not
cooled continues to increase because of the residual heat. The major
risk associated to these events is the degradation of the fuel circuit
components due to the high temperature achieved. To prevent this
risk, some provisions are implemented in the design, such as the
emergency draining of the fuel salt. The “fuel salt freezing scenario” is
characterized by the solidification of the fuel salt in a large part of the
fuel circuit. No exact cause of this scenario has been identified until
now. However, it has been kept in the list of events to be studied in
order to test the limits of the design.
4.2. Comparison of MLD and FFMEA
The FFMEA and the MLD methods are based on different ap-
proaches: with the FFMEA the user is led to reason from a func-
tional point of view by looking for the possible causes of the loss of
the functions and their consequences; while the MLD approach is
more phenomenological and the user identifies the causes of
phenomena that can lead to the physical degradation of the system.
Both methods have proved to be relevant for the purpose despite
some lacks of precise data on MSFR components, systems or pro-
cedures. Indeed, in both methods the link with the component
arrives only in a second time, making them more suitable to an
application at early design phase.
The results agreed well and many events were found indepen-
dently with both methods. However, few events appeared only in
one of the two analyses. For the application of theMLD to theMSFR,
risks have been differentiated according to the physical phenomena
involved and the method also revealed risks caused by external
hazards or by the action of other systems of the plant. For instance,
the events “Loss of Chemical Control: Chemical reaction between
different fluids” or “Mechanical Degradation: Ejection of a power
conversion system component in direction of the fuel circuit” only
appeared through the MLD analysis. On the other hand, the FFMEA
brought more details on the failure modes thanks to the effort to
link the loss of each function to a component or system failure. For
instance, even if the breach in the upper reflector was well iden-
tified with the MLD, the FFMEA highlighted the fact that the breach
could involve the rupture of the wall cooling systems and/or the
expansion vessel system.
The FFMEA has the advantage to provide additional information
on the systems or procedures used for detection, prevention and
mitigation, in a very preliminary approach to the defence in depth,
while the MLD offers a good graphical tool to present the hazards
and helps understand the logical connections between them.
In conclusion, the combined use of the FFMEA and the MLD
methods proved to be useful to ensure a more complete identifi-
cation of the hazards and initiating events of the MSFR. In addition,
as a complementary result, both the methods helped to highlight
the open points of the project, which could be taken into account
during next steps of the design.Please cite this article as: D. Gerardin et al., A methodology for the iden
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In a solid-fuelled reactor, the accident initiators are traditionally
classified in the following families (list “a minima”): LOCA (Loss of
Coolant Accident), LOF (Loss of Flow), LOHS (Loss of Heat Sink), TOP
(Transient OverPower), TLOP (Total Loss Of Power) and OVC
(Overcooling) [25]. Moreover, in the IRSN report [26], for PWRs the
term “severe accident” refers to an event causing significant dam-
age to reactor fuel and resulting from more or less complete core
meltdown”.
From the list of accident initiators, it can be noticed that a direct
transposition of these categories to theMSFR is not possible and the
biggest differences between the liquid-fuelled reactors and the
solid-fuelled reactors are linked to peculiar characteristics of the
latter: the liquid nature of the fuel makes necessary a new defini-
tion of severe accident detached from the concept of core melting
and at the same time introduces new accident initiators such as the
“Loss of fuel flow”, which was not conceived in the LWRs.
The safety analysis of the PIE should also take into account the
particular arrangement of safety systems. The reactivity control
systems deserve a special mention since the control rods are
substituted by a bubbling control system for the reactivity man-
agement in normal operation conditions in the current MSFR
design and the EDS for the geometrical subcritical redistribution of
the core in case of emergency. The design and the operation of the
EDS represent one of the major safety issues of this reactor. The
concept and the dimension of the system constitute an open point
of the project, as well as the Decay Heat Removal systems for long
term accident management should be more precisely designed and
tested. As regard radiological containment, barriers must also be
defined with due account for the liquid nature of the fuel. Then, in a
later stage, the safety architecture will have to be consolidated,
notably ensuring proper implementation of the defence-in-depth
in the design.
Along with the implementation of the tools, some open points
on the design, the systems, the phenomena and procedures of the
MSFR are highlighted with their advantages and drawbacks, to give
inputs for the evolution of the concept in the optic of a safety-
driven design.
5. Conclusion
A list of Postulated Initiating Events is produced, as reference
accidents for the successive deterministic analyses that will be
performed to assess the severity of the involved phenomena and
transients. The list of PIEs will evolve as the design is refined step by
step and the deterministic analysis on components and transients
are performed. The outputs of this work represent a common
starting point to be refined: it is plausible that some of the haz-
ardous events will be removed of the list because successive ana-
lyses could show their inconsistency. On the other hand this
analysis may lead the designers to provide design modifications
such that some events are no longer to be considered (if they are
physically impossible for example). Nevertheless, the list will likely
include new events that are not highlighted yet.
Successively each accident scenario has to be classified into
frequencies and consequences macro-categories (in terms of
damages to the asset and environmental releases) and one or more
risk matrices will be built using consistent definitions of techno-
logical inclusive riskmetrics and severe accidents: based on the risk
level of each accidental sequence, a number of lines of defence (e.g.
provisions, protection systems, etc.) is under definition for the
unprotected sequences therefore the final objective of this meth-
odology is to help sketching the architecture of the system.
In the current study, the state of normal operation during powertification of the postulated initiating events of the Molten Salt Fast
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maintenance as well as start-up and shut-down procedures. Simi-
larly, the scope of the analysis is limited to the fuel circuit and the
systems directly connected and interacting with the fuel circuit. A
wider study should be performed to include other systems such as
the routine draining tanks and the processing units.
This first implementation of the methodology presented here is
not exhaustive nonetheless it has been useful not only to highlight
missing information, lack of provisions and criticalities of the sys-
tem but also to define a procedure that can be applied iteratively
with the evolution of the design and the knowledge of the transient
behaviours.
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